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Abstract
There is a fairly closed circle between culture, language, meaning, and truth such that the world of
a given culture is a world understood in terms of the meanings produced in that culture. Medicine
is, in fact, a subculture of a powerful type and has its own language and understanding of the range
of illnesses that affect human beings. So how does medicine get at the truth of people and their ills
in such a way as to escape its own limited constructions? There is a way out of the closed circle
implicit in the idea of a praxis and the engagement with reality that is central to it and the further
possibility introduced by Jacques Lacan that signification is never comprehensive in relation to the
subject's encounter with the real. I will explore both of these so as to develop a conception of truth
that is apt for the knowledge that arises in the clinic.
Background
"Medicine has for long possessed the qualities neces-
sary to make a science. These are a starting point and
a known method according to which many valuable
discoveries have been made over a long period of time
[1]."
The known method of the Hippocratics was rooted in
healing practice, spurred by the actuality of human
suffering, and it built on folk medicine by careful doc-
umentation of cases, interventions, and the effects of
those interventions. Such a method cautiously accu-
mulates a conceptual and theoretical apparatus influ-
enced by the culture in which it has grown. In fact it
gives rise to its own "medical culture" and a discursive
regime that is in a position to become privileged as
medicine achieves institutional status and political
power. The result can be a quite restrictive view of
what counts as truth such that the science becomes
increasingly normalised as a cultural production. The
regime of truth that develops defines its own scientific
standards, disciplines, rules, and methods of valida-
tion and can effectively exclude all apart from the
orthodox and privileged.
Truth therefore needs to reserve for itself the possibil-
ity of subversion or escape from the closed discursive
circle that potentially restrict s the gaze and the imag-
ination of the seekers after truth, it needs, in a word,
a dynamic encounter with reality of the type we can
make sense of after the philosophical semantics of
Jacques Lacan [1]. I will argue that if we broaden the
notion of trauma from its psychoanalytic origins we
can understand the "traumatizing" of the closed
world of language and truth by the incursion of the
medical encounter as it occurs in the presences and
silences of the clinic. This, I will claim gives rise to a
form of repetition that is the midwife of the will to
truth (or more adequate untruth). But this journey
can only begin if we recognise the potential impasse
faced by any scientific endeavour.
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Truth, science, and culture
Medical science has followed the ideal of scientific objec-
tivity so that we make observations, offer theories about
the realities they indicate and assess those theories in the
light of our ongoing accumulation of clinical and scien-
tific evidence. But, as Kuhn and others have argued, the
paradigm within which we work licenses certain evalua-
tive judgments about the evidence and the means by
which it is obtained which are themselves nested within
its own structure of belief such that the formation of any
scientist requires one to be inducted into "a strenuous and
devoted attempt to force nature into the conceptual boxes
supplied" [2]. In medicine (as in its parent approach to
scientific objectivity) we cling to the dogma that evidence
is by nature true whereas theory is inference and therefore
subject to flaws in reasoning even though it may, by suc-
cessive refinement, approximate truth. But Feyerabend
raises a voice of dissent;
Experience arises together with theoretical assumptions
not before them, and an experience without theory is just
as incomprehensible as is (allegedly) a theory without
experience: eliminate part of the theoretical knowledge of
a sensing subject and you have a person who is completely
disorientated and incapable of carrying out the simplest
action. Eliminate further knowledge and his sensory
world (his 'observation language') will start disintegrat-
ing. [3]
These points are familiar to post-Kantian philosophers
but run counter to a belief in scientific realism according
to which the world is the way science says it is because
there is a transparent and simply verifiable correspond-
ence between our scientific descriptions and the reality
they describe. On this view, science reveals the nature of
the world and the processes going on within it and dis-
closes facts about human health and disease. It comes as
a surprise to many medical scientists that there are signif-
icant shifts in scientific theory: "viewed sub specie eternitatis
scientists (even physical scientists) are a fickle lot. The his-
tory of science is a tale of multifarious shiftings of alle-
giance from theory to theory" [4].
Such arguments in contemporary philosophy of science,
critique the idea that medicine is an interconnected "total-
ity of truths equally open to all scientific inquirers who
may share their techniques and experiences" [5]. The
truths concerned begin to look more like a cultural prod-
uct of "normal medical science" than we often admit.
Hacking identifies seven "styles of scientific reasoning"
that illustrate both the diversity and interconnectedness of
the web of scientific belief: (a) postulates and axioms such
as the idea that discernible structure underpins and
explains function. Structure is investigated by increasingly
sophisticated methods such as electron microscopy and
nuclear magnetic resonance scanning but we do not ques-
tion the thought that we can and do identify that which
gives rise to the diversity of medical phenomena. We con-
jecture that the macroscopic and microscopic structures
reveal the causes of human function and dysfunction
rather than any top-down or holistic determination of
structure by context (for instance in embryology or psy-
cho-neuro-immunology [6].
Experimental exploration and measurement are interwoven
with the investigation of structure and function and the
thought that experimental data constitute the objective,
self-declaring foundations of biomedicine. But Feyer-
abend warns us that this data and its objectivity are coeval
with the theoretical structures motivating its capture.
Hypothetical modelling is related to and in "reflective equi-
librium" with other attitudes and techniques defining
medicine. It shades into axiomatic thinking to generate
models such as "immune surveillance", neoplastic trans-
formation, the genesis of atherosclerosis, and the axes of
psychiatric diagnosis. In each case (for instance in psychi-
atric diagnosis) an overarching thesis (such as the idea
that a disorder is an internal derangement of an individual
and understandable in terms of individual departure from
biological norms) conditions the kinds of data that are
sought and looked for to explain medical phenomena.
Medical taxonomy is founded on the idea of natural kinds
[7,8], whereby general terms are taken to designate phe-
nomena naturally occurring in the actual world, such as
gold, tigers, water, oxidation, and white blood cells. These
terms "carve nature at its joints" underpinning a realist
metaphysics. But we should notice that taxonomic catego-
ries reflect the best current scientific knowledge in the rel-
evant area so that the linguistic community defers to the
scientific experts and therefore the category becomes de
facto a product of orthodox scientific theory. Therefore a
radical and serious challenge to the scientific theory
applied to the phenomena in question has metaphysical
implications and can affect even basic questions about
when a certain scientific kind or phenomenon (such as
Oxygen) was discovered and by whom [9].
There is a vigorous debate about whether diseases are nat-
ural kinds (in the sense defined) and represent objectively
specifiable, dysfunctions of the organism they affect [10]
because some would argue that classifying a bodily condi-
tion as a disease involves both describing and evaluating
the state of an organism [11-13]. If that is so, our claim to
scientific objectivity has to concede that the terms in
which we do the science are infused with evaluations and
potential sources of selective bias.Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2006, 1:13 http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/13
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Statistical analysis therefore appears in a different light
because, as a method of finding non-coincidental correla-
tions between phenomena – thereby linking taxonomic
categories – it is subject to the uncertainties and qualifica-
tions applicable to the categories. These statistical associ-
ations may be supported by, for instance, showing that
drugs with known effects on certain biochemical proc-
esses have a statistically demonstrable influence on the
course of disease. Indeed that conjunction of methods is
often used to derive a patho-physiological story about dis-
ease, but notice how dependent it is on what we choose to
measure, count as significant, and have interventions for.
Historical or genetic explanation of the occurrence of a path-
ological abnormality in terms of bodily structure and
function is our way of understanding diseases and their
therapy. The relevant explanations are tied to our concep-
tions of natural kinds, and laws of nature, and therefore,
again, to the models and taxonomies central to the web of
belief that is contemporary biomedicine.
Laboratory science is a growing part of medical science as
the means of isolating and investigating the processes and
events that lie behind (clinical) phenomena and it gives
operational effect (and thereby technological or mathe-
matical legitimacy) to our scientific taxonomies.
This mix of theory and methodology yields a preferred
description for (and means of documenting or measur-
ing) every disease, composed from resources provided by
the paradigm (or network of theory, technology, and prac-
tices) of contemporary clinical biomedicine. The enter-
prise is Hippocratic in that it is pragmatic, causal and
naturalistic, based on observation, and grounded in a sci-
entific model of human function but it is also transformed
and encultured by reductive biomedicine emerging from
enlightenment aspirations to exhaustive and complete
Truth about the world and everything in it including
human health and disease.
Consider an important example – subarachnoid haemor-
rhage (SAH) due to a berry aneurysm on one of the cere-
bral arteries (a berry aneurysm is an out-pouching of a
cerebral artery caused by a deficiency in the arterial wall).
We believe that increasing blood pressure during life
causes the aneurysm to stretch and then split. The aneu-
rysm ruptures causing a haemorrhage around and some-
times into the brain which can be fatal. We detect the
haemorrhage and the aneurysm by imaging the brain and
its blood vessels. Then we try and obliterate the aneurysm
to prevent recurrent haemorrhages.
This problem and its resolution is a testimony to the prac-
tice of meticulous post-mortem examination of people
who have died from strokes, the development of imaging
techniques to reveal structures inside the head, theoretical
modelling of a pathological process, and the development
of neurosurgical techniques (and supporting therapies
such as analgesia, antisepsis, anaesthetics, and pharma-
cology). Despite its technical complexity this is a compar-
atively simple conceptual exercise aimed at an anatomical
anomaly and the problems arising when one tries to cor-
rect it. But aspects of the problem elude us. Why does an
aneurysm split and bleed when it does? What causes the
vaso-spasm that sometimes follows SAH and causes a dis-
abling stroke? Why do some people recover well and oth-
ers badly? These questions, like many arising in the clinic
from the inadequacy of our responses to human suffering,
are not well addressed by contemporary bio-medical sci-
ence, and yet the scientific approach of positivist biomed-
icine remains dominant both in treatment and in funded
research into the conditions presenting themselves for
medical attention. We do fund a search for the chemicals
in the cerebro-spinal fluid that might promote vaso-
spasm. We do fund neuro-cognitive tests of memory, exec-
utive function, speech, and so on. We do look at drugs
thought to mitigate this or that source of damage in such
an event. All these technologies focus on a biomedical
construction of SAH and there is a powerful coalition
between medical science and the researched medicines
industry in pursuing them. What of other healing meth-
ods – meditation, natural foods, herbal treatment, or the
disciplines aimed at the health of the soul? These have no
place in our conceptions of SAH, so they get a mention
neither in our science nor in our clinical methodology. We
are not open-minded about SAH as a human phenome-
non, we conceive it on the model of the human machine
and its dysfunctions and if the truth about susceptibility
to SAH (or heart disease, or diabetes, or schizophrenia)
lies beyond such conceptions, we are blind to it.
Medical culture and its discursive regime
To understand why such an open position is hard to attain
we need to examine the culture that is biomedicine. We
can begin with Foucault's account of the relationships
between social, political, and economic power and Truth
(the capitalization is important when discussing Scientific
realism).
In societies like ours, the "political economy" of truth is
characterized by five important traits. "Truth" is centered
on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions
which produce it; it is subject to constant economic and
political incitement (the demand for truth, as much for
economic production as for political power): it is the
object, under diverse forms, of immense diffusion and
consumption (circulating through apparatuses of educa-
tion and information whose extent is relatively broad in
the social body, notwithstanding certain strict limita-
tions); it is produced and transmitted under the control,Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2006, 1:13 http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/13
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dominant if not exclusive, of a few great political and eco-
nomic apparatuses (university, army, writing, media);
lastly, it is the issue of a whole political debate and social
confrontation ("ideological" struggles). [14]
These features define the culture of medical science as it
arises from and within medical institutions, knowledge,
and political alliances.
Medicine clearly locates its truth within scientific discourse
The entire move towards Evidence Based Medicine (EBM),
laudable as it is, has recast medical knowledge such that
experimental studies designed to isolate single effective
interventions (perhaps acting in combination) take on the
highest status and, by so doing, lock in place a reductive
model of health and disease.
It is incited to further efforts to expand and use that truth 
from within and without
The focus on EBM means that the knowledge of health
and disease is constructed in terms of what might lead to
effective interventions that can be manufactured, mar-
keted, and applied to the human body. This focus influ-
ences clinical explanation and therefore the ends toward
which diagnosis is oriented.
It is diffused and consumed in a huge number of different 
ways
Medical thinking (and low level medically influenced
advice and "pop wisdom") are everywhere in Western
society – magazines, television, films, and advertising.
None of these sources undertake intelligent deconstruc-
tion or critique – they evince the "sound-bite" mentality
whereby any map of the health care terrain is "dumbed
down" into simplistic terms – condition X is treated by
drug Y (from company Z).
The practice of medicine is dominated by methodologies 
sponsored by the big players
The alliance between major pharmaceutical concerns, the
institutions performing medical research, government
regulatory bodies setting standards for health care, and
the organized profession instances Foucault's "political
and economic apparatus" and reinforces the accepted sci-
entific view of health and disease (which has, to be fair,
led to nearly all the major advances in health care, partic-
ularly in the Twentieth Century). These alliances identify
good quality care with the latest and most expensive med-
ical technology and therefore undermine clinical acumen
(a particular clinical synthesis by an experienced physi-
cian) in favour of objective indicators based on the gen-
eral features of the case and a recipe of therapy. This
conception of good clinical practice makes physicians use
the latest technology because reliance on their own, per-
haps very experienced, judgment could leave them
exposed to medico-legal risk if, as is bound to happen at
least sometimes, things do not turn out well.
It is a major focus of political and social debate
Modern medicine is part of a discursive regime in which
those who live and die within it are measured and of
immense social importance. Clinical medicine, arm in
arm with science and the political weight of the profes-
sion, dominates the debate about health care provision by
any society, a debate with symbolic significance for any
caring society, political relevance to the controllers of soci-
ety, and huge economic implications.
The cultural context outlined is seen par excellence in the
conceptual structure of the DSM system of psychiatric
classification. DSM represents a taxonomy of mental ill-
ness primarily conceived as a range of disorders of the
individual which can be diagnosed on the basis of an
objective checklist of features and thereby fitted, as best
the mental disorder of any individual can be, into a gen-
eral classification susceptible to documentable interven-
tions. In the broader context of the critical claim that the
range of maladies of the soul should be as detailed as the
range of souls who suffer [15], the DSM seems to perpet-
uate a cultural orientation towards meaning-giving in the
context of mental distress that is conditioned by aspira-
tions to self-constitute psychiatry on the model of disease
locked into the natural sciences (rather than the mental or
moral sciences).
It is this culture, and biomedical science as one of its pro-
ductions, that is vulnerable to the critiques I have men-
tioned. Kuhn's claim that science is not merely the gradual
accumulation of truth to provide a unified structure of
knowledge which encompasses natural phenomena but
rather is marked by revolutions in which old paradigms
are attacked, ravaged, and discarded or abandoned
through creeping disaffection so that new paradigms take
their place. He noted that the reasons for paradigm shift
may not reflect debates within "the logical structure of sci-
entificknowledge" [16] itself, of course, a cultural produc-
tion. He argued that the competing paradigms often do
not compete on the same playing field according to the
same rules and may require a re-valuation of scientific
standards.
When paradigms enter, as they must, into a debate about
paradigm choice, their role is necessarily circular ... each
paradigm will be shown to satisfy more or less the criteria
that it dictates for itself and to fall short of those dictated
by its opponent [17].
But if new paradigms accept different base theories and
methods of investigation and validate their data in differ-
ent ways [18], then it is hard to see where the impetus forPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2006, 1:13 http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/13
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change arises. A fairly localized example of this process
might be the switch in medical theory prompted by the
discovery that Burkitt's Lymphoma as a neoplasia or can-
cer) was caused by infection with a certain virus stimulat-
ing immune cells to embark upon a course of
disproportionate growth and reproduction. Prior to this
discovery, infective diseases and neoplasia occupied dif-
ferent groups in our pathological classifications and new
theories were developed to allow us to investigate the pos-
sibility that viral infection may play a causal role in can-
cer. Thus an answer previously marked wrong in any
medical examination, viz. that some cancers are caused by
infection, became right; what was untrue became true.
This, however, is hardly a paradigm shift. At a basic level,
the role of DNA both as part of the original genetic expla-
nation of neoplasia and in viral action could be easily
accommodated within medical theory.
Somewhat more radical is the challenge to the reductive
basis of biomedicine posed by holistic therapy and the
idea that the psychosomatic organism considered as a
whole may influence even detailed molecular and patho-
physiological processes contributing to disease in ways
that cannot be defined by technologically driven medical
laboratory science. If the effect of "holistic pseudo-sci-
ence" becomes discernible enough to trouble us then we
might begin to doubt the adequacy of the reductive bio-
medicine we now accept as unquestionable fact.
Similar points are made by Foucault in his comments on
scientific revolutions:
... [their] extent and rapidity are only the sign of some-
thing else: a modification in the rules of formation of
statements which are accepted as scientifically true. This is
not a change of content (refutation of old errors, recovery
of old truths), nor is it a change of theoretical form
(renewal of paradigm, modification of systematic ensem-
bles). It is a question of what governs statements, and the
way in which they govern each other so as to constitute a
set of propositions which are scientifically acceptable, and
hence capable of being verified or falsified by scientific
procedures. In short, there is a problem of the regime, the
politics of the scientific statement [19].
Notice that Foucault is not speaking merely about com-
peting descriptions or theories but rather "a regime of
knowledge" governing the rules of formation of state-
ments, rules that, although unstated, determine what
counts as scientifically respectable according to legiti-
mated concepts of observation, demonstration, confirma-
tion of theory, validation of hypotheses, and so on. There
is no straightforward assessment of theories here, "the
regime" is much more inclusive and examining it poses
searching questions about "the governance of statements"
and the constraints on the corpus of knowledge that are
sensitive to relations of power, both economic and politi-
cal. These constraints control the discourses shaping our
thoughts about human beings, their welfare, their repro-
ductive activity, their "deviance", and their sanity. There-
fore the socio-cultural and political aspects of medicine
constitute a regime of truth informing clinical practice
and the research "industry" central to contemporary bio-
medicine.
Foucault's analysis is sufficiently radical to call into ques-
tion the very nature of biomedical science and its truth as
distinct from dogma or opinion rooted in a culture that is
based on financial interest, expediency, and professional
power networks. Clinical science needs a philosophical
response to this challenge robust enough to confront the
ideologues of cultural relativism. There is a pragmatic
response to this worry that recalls the Hippocratic view
that medicine is a paradigmatic science with a starting
point – human suffering, and a method – intervention,
documentation and reflection, but there is an even more
fundamental response based in philosophical semantics
after Lacan. First the pragmatic response.
A pragmatic response to relativism
Wittgenstein grounds meaning and truth in such a way
that the meaning of any term is given by its use within
some human practice [20] and truth results from the use
of a term in accordance with the rules operating in that
practice. Thus my statement to a trainee surgeon, "That is
the carotid artery" when I have surgically exposed the
carotid artery, is true and its contradiction false because I
have used the term in accordance with the rules governing
anatomical statements.
Wittgenstein likens words to tools and their meanings to
the functions of tools, implying that the use of words from
different discourses is like the use of tools from different
activities. On this analogy, judgments about whether a set
of words yielded knowledge would be like asking whether
a hammer or a whisk did its job well. We might conclude
that a hammer is a good tool in the work shed but not for
cooking and vice versa for the whisk. Thus the aptness of
a meaning to convey the truth about a situation is like the
aptness of a tool for a task. Because our linguistically struc-
tured clinical activity has practical purposes, a pragmatic
approach to the knowledge and truth is plausibly the one
most suited to medicine [21]. But then the fact that differ-
ent discourses have different purposes or activities associ-
ated undercuts the claim that a unitary standard of truth
applies to all statements about health and illness [22].
The medical object is not given, it is constructed in the
course of the activity of medicine, and in this sense it is a
historically constructed object, the product or artefact ofPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2006, 1:13 http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/13
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the relevant history of medicine. And so, too, is the prac-
titioner or medical specialist, who comes to be that con-
crete individual by engaging in that practice.(1997, p63–
4)
We should not, however, too easily slide into the idea that
the functions identified and investigated by biomedical
science are nothing but constructions of medical practices
because a practice aims to make a difference in the world
and medicine is an art addressed to the alleviation of
human suffering.
Here we can find some guidance by examining a
Hippocratic discipline – psycho-therapy – that has had to
confront longstanding and thorny problems about its
proper object. Lacan, remarking on the scientific status of
psycho-analysis, notes that a basic minimum for any sci-
ence is that it should have a definite object, although the
object "changes, and in a very strange way, as a science
develops" [23]. He notices the semantic ontology of phys-
ics where we have held on to something despite the fact
that the electron of early modern physics is not that of con-
temporary quantum theory. But is there a path from that
inquiry to our present topic: the nature of medical truth?
Disease-states are grounded in suffering so that the
patient's suffering gives us a basic reference point for
reflection on the medical object. However, such is the
imperialism of scientific pathology and pathophysiology
in medicine that many things of which patients complain,
such as headaches arising from cervical spondylosis or
chronic fatigue syndrome, are not recognized as diseases
because we have no legitimated account of their patho-
genesis and pathophysiology. Other things are regarded as
diseases in that they represent deviations from biological
norms (such as anemia, obesity, osteoporosis, or hamar-
tomas) which are, as I have noted, to some extent artefacts
of the diagnostic sciences and techniques of bio-measure-
ment (for instance, obesity depends on identifying a per-
son's Body Mass Index). Lacan examines briefly the ability
to generate such formulae and notes that "a false science,
just like a true science, may be expressed in formulae" [24]
as is evident not only in alchemy, which Lacan mentions,
but also other "false sciences" like phrenology, tarot,
numerology, and palmistry. If, therefore, measurement,
precision, and formulae do not distinguish true medical
science from pseudo-science, we need other grounds for a
robust concept of medical truth. To find them, more
needs to be said about culture and meaning.
Language, culture, and truth – the semantic 
circle
Contemporary continental philosophy follows structural-
ist conceptions of meaning in terms of the relationships of
contrast and connectedness between signs. The central
insight (closely relevant to understanding Lacan) is that
language is based on a system of distinctions allowing us
to group things according to our interests. Levi-Strauss
argues that this is the most fundamental semantic move
made by any language using group interweaving socio-
cultural space with "natural" space [25] and it recalls Witt-
genstein's claims that concepts are tied to our interests and
meanings to the ways we use words [26]. It is evident that
the differences to which a group responds and chooses to
mark with signs are embedded in their ways of dealing
with the world. Meanings, on this view, comprise differ-
ences between exploitable features of the environment
which function as part of a system in which they have sys-
tematic structural relationships to one another. In fact this
kind of pragmatic post-structuralism is a very plausible
view; imagine for instance, an attempt to give an account
of why it was important to learn the difference between a
chisel and a screwdriver, or between parsley and paprika
without mentioning the physical world and our bodily
interactions with it.
We can therefore maintain that the contents of our
thought are formulated in terms of the discourse which
gives us a way of organising our responses to the environ-
ment in which that discourse has taken shape. Therefore
the concepts and judgments made by a linguistic or cul-
tural community in fixing the significance of various fea-
tures of and occurrences in that environment frames their
knowledge and the truths they are able to grasp. For
instance, it would be hard to argue that the idea of roman-
tic music could take serious hold in a society which did
not have a history which spanned contrasting categories
such as baroque, classical, or expressionist. Saussure
remarks that the signified partakes of cognitive (and cul-
tural) relations syntagmatically (or systematically) linked
to  signifiers  such that structural distinctions mark the
world in ways apt for structuring our interaction with it.
Structure, on this view (as for Levi-Strauss), is unavoida-
bly world-involving (Wittgenstein indicates this fact by
using the term "grammar" to discuss the primitive lan-
guage of the builder and labourer and its elaboration).
Therefore any plausible theory of meaning must pay
attention to the way a subject categorizes the conditions in
which she finds herself as is evident in the old saw of
Fregean theory, "the morning star" and "the evening star"
both of which refer to the planet Venus. A person may
know what "the evening star' means without knowing this
fact. Such a person knows the meaning of the term "the
evening star" and that it is true that the evening star
appears in the evening but not that the morning star and
the planet Venus are also visible or that "the evening star'
is not a star. All these terms – "morning", "evening",
"star", and "planet" – mark things in the world according
to our ways of thinking and not just according to thePhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2006, 1:13 http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/13
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object being referred to by the terms involved. We can use
them without realising that the object we are talking
about or thinking in one way is also picked out by another
way of thinking. These arguments add credibility to the
strong thesis that culture determines language and
through that productive relationship determines the
truths available to a subject but the story should not end
there.
Lacan offers us a way out of this circle of signification. He
introduces a number of terms in order to articulate his
theory about language and meaning.
The tuche is the actual lived encounter with the world,
which Freud refers to as "the trauma" [27]. On this
account the subject develops an understanding of what is
around them in part by using signifiers made available by
language to build or appropriate its structure into a repre-
sentation of the world. For Lacan, the tuche – "the first
encounter, the real, that lies behind the phantasy" – links
us to what is around us.
Language (Langue) is a structured system forming the com-
plex symbolic order "in which the world of things will
come to be arranged" [28]. This structured system pro-
vides a human group with the categories used in thinking,
categories predating any person's entry into the world. It
is presided over by powerful figures who know how the
world works, like the notional father who is identified
with "the figure of the law" (whether an actual father or an
icon) and represents the authority of the socio-cultural
nexus which determines the significations that should be
applied to things [29]. Lacan (following Levi-Strauss)
notes that the symbols form a network underpinning the
exchanges of a human group [30] and for any given
human being this network transcends the individual to
form the context shaping the individual psyche: "human
psychology cannot be conceived in the absence of the
function of the subject defined as the effect of the signi-
fier" [31]. The thoughts and projects of human beings are
framed in terms of this shared system.
Speech (Parole) is the medium of interpersonal exchange
derived from language and in it I find myself mirrored by
others and their descriptions of me. I have an important
(and creative) role in this discursive project of speaking
life into language because in use [32], including my use,
words take on life or meaning.
The signifier and the signified therefore are intrinsic to the
idea of truth as a relation between the subject and the
world in which the subject lives. But notice that the
semantic content associated with a given sign may evolve
and change with changes in the language in which that
sign has life. What is more, the discursive history of the
subject, which is the shaping ground of the psyche, is part
of an evolving project (by a human group) in which truth
must be brought into being, both truth about the world
and truth about themselves. Lacan, by accepting a struc-
turalist view of meaning and also emphasising the tuche or
encounter with the real, puts an interesting twist on the
Freudian "thing", which Freud himself directly borrowed
from the Kantian "ding an sich". The structure of language
delimits the encountered "thing"(moment, trauma,
tuche) as thinkable but the thing in itself affects me apart
from its thinkability.
This insight shows us where we might go beyond the circle
of culture, signification and socially constructed truth. The
tuche or encounter with the real which is close to Freud's
trauma or disturbing event in itself is signified by the sub-
ject but no-thing ever can be fully captured by significa-
tion as there is always that aspect to an encounter which
has a causal effect on one but does not find a home in
one's system of signification. (I would explicitly link the
inexpressibility of that elusive relation between the sub-
ject and the object to the causal properties of the encoun-
ter.) We can, in fact, generalize this observation and notice
that there are aspects to any event which are part of the
totality of the world as it appears in, but is not fully cap-
tured by, the totality of my current significations deployed
in the situation concerned and their symbolic connec-
tions.
We might repeat this generalizing move and notice that
the encounter with the real is also an encounter with the
object as it is encountered by and signified by others
whose subjectivity vis-à-vis the object is necessarily incom-
pletely accessible to any given subject, through conversa-
tion and what is revealed there. That fact potentially leads
one to feel that there is more to an encounter than one can
currently (or indeed ever fully) comprehend and the
resulting psychic incompleteness is potentially disturbing
or worrying. Lacan argues that the attempt to get control
of this elusive aspect of the encounter with the real is the
basis of repetition whereby something that outstrips the
ability of my signifiers to capture it causes psychic fascina-
tion or "sticking".
Repetition, (regarded by Lacan as one of the four basic con-
cepts of psychoanalysis), is the tendency to be drawn back
to an event or focus of mental disquiet that has not been
satisfactorily integrated into conscious thought. It indi-
cates a gap between the encounter and the signification:
"repeating ... is related to ... remembering" but is not
encompassed in narrative memories because the real adds
an elusive quality to the repeated encounter "the real is
that which always comes back to the same place – to the
place where the subject in so far as he thinks, where the res
cogitans, does not meet it" [33]. The Cartesian allusion isPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2006, 1:13 http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/13
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telling in that Lacan undermines the twin theses that the
contents of the mind are transparent to conscious reflec-
tion and that those contents are solely in terms of existing
significations. Lacan clams that they are not transparent
and their content goes beyond what signifiers can (as it
were) "swallow" or capture in intentional terms.
The next move picks up the point that repetition shows
itself, par excellence, in a restless driven-ness to close the
gap between encounter and signification. This gap means
that whereas praxis adds an element of practical involve-
ment in the real world to our significations of things, the
tuche adds a similar subjective involvement.
Truth and the encounter with reality after Lacan
Any praxis occurs within and defines a field of activity in
which its practitioners work and its concepts enable one
to locate (cognitively), interact with, and exploit the
objects constituting that field. But rather than finding that
legitimation and power define experience (as in strong
forms of socio-cultural constructionism) a further possi-
bility is found in the encounter with the real that escapes
signification and provokes repetition. The repetition is
particularly likely if the practitioners are attuned to suffer-
ing and the tools provided by an epistemic regime do not
adequately meet the actual sufferings of human beings (as
in Hippocratic times).
Notice the structure of the argument:
1. Truth is a product of language and the encounter with
the real.
2. Language is a product of culture.
3. The encounter with the real may demand more than
language can provide.
4. It particularly does so where our praxis is motivated
towards a certain kind of adequacy.
5. A Hippocratic praxis is motivated to provide an ade-
quate response to suffering.
6. Theoretically doctrinaire medicine may not be such a
response.
7. Hippocratic practice is driven to go beyond its tools of
signification and find new truths to be engaged with and
given articulate form.
We can add Foucault's acknowledgement that not all sci-
ences are on an equal footing in their vulnerability to
"social forces". He argues that sciences such as theoretical
physics and organic chemistry are relatively immune to
such influences. But what makes a science more likely to
restlessly search for truth and less likely to be subject to
power relations shaping its discourses of validation?
Medicine provides an interesting case study. On the one
hand it is practical and has palpable results so that the
cycle of conceptualization, intervention, monitoring of
results, and refinement of theory can be kept in touch
with real world events at the coalface that is the clinic.
Toulmin (invoking Wittgenstein's concept "form of life")
speaks of a medical Lebenswelt  (life-world) comprising
Lebensformen  (forms of life) or "different substantive
enterprises that have survived the pragmatic tests to which
they were subjected in the evolution of those enterprises"
[34]. Therefore the Hippocratic foundations of medicine
provide a reality check on medical truth.
On the other hand, there is a discursive regime condition-
ing contemporary biomedical science the outlines of
which I have already sketched. This regime exclusively fos-
ters a relatively mechanistic conception of human func-
tion. It has invisible but palpable control of the medical
research industry and over many facets of clinical life,
including the legal constraints on best practice – which
tend to track technology rather than clear evidence of effi-
cacy. Given the interests converging at the point where
medicine meets power, the political process, and econom-
ics, we might worry that medicine itself is more prone
than other branches of science to ideological and axio-
matic distortion. Even the focus on evidence might be a
convenient and effective means by which orthodoxy
cements its hold on the profession and thereby on the
human population it serves.
If a naive, or modestly critical, realist view of scientific
knowledge is unsustainable, wherever the regime of truth
is shown to have significant political, economic, and cul-
tural determinants, how can we justify the view that, in
medicine, we are seeking a knowledge transcendent truth
(of the type beloved by realists of all stripes)?
Orthodoxy, trauma, and repetition
Foucault's challenge to the conventional notion of truth
and his focus on power in determining what is accepted as
valid knowledge are disturbing to those wanting to escape
cultural idealism. Can we, in the face of such doubts, erect
any boundary (even if it is fuzzy, shifting, and difficult to
define) between those aspects of medical knowledge
which are vulnerable to post-Kuhnian and Foucauldian
critiques and those which are not?
We can find some aspects of what we need (as Pellegrino
claims) in the Aristotelian idea of a techne  – an art
informed by technical knowledge and reflection showing
a dynamic interplay between praxis and conceptualiza-Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2006, 1:13 http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/13
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tion [35]. This approach (as Toulmin showed) has clear
conceptual links to Wittgenstein's analysis of meaning
and truth arising within language games and forms of life
and evades, to some extent, the challenge directed at tra-
ditional epistemology.
Traditional epistemology posits a relation between two
independent terms – the world and the thinker mediated
by the ideas of the thinker. Thus the traditional epistemic
problem: if the thinker only knows about the world
through (theoretically informed) ideas (and observa-
tions), how does she know what things are really like
objectively? Traditional idealists and many post-modern
writers conclude from this problem that ideas, language,
or discourses are internal and self-regulating such that dif-
ferent discourses result in hermetically sealed construc-
tions of reality. Truth then becomes located within a
particular discourse so that there can be apparently con-
tradictory claims arising within different discourses. A leb-
enswelt  and its lebensformen  are, however, different
particularly when focused on something as complex and
multifaceted as human suffering. Reality constantly
engages the healer so that medicine could be thought of as
a kind of institutional neurosis in which the intractability
of suffering demands repetitive attention to our inadequa-
cies in dealing with it. Any less ethically driven response
then becomes impure or immoral and compromises the
truth of our proceedings (for Lacan, a feature of true sci-
ence is the "purity of soul of the operator" [36]).
The pragmatists direct our attention toward the purposes
and interests served by knowledge and the cultural cri-
tique of scientific realism bites at just this point. But this
concession, as in general epistemology, need not under-
mine a substantial conception of truth (as related to pur-
pose driven cognitive maps of a domain of praxis)
particularly when, after Lacan, we examine the tuche.
Truth is a function of a given cognitive map (and therefore
Lebenswelt). Because it is advantageous not to have a series
of isolated and impressionistic maps of any domain of
activity, human thinkers tend to make connections
between intersecting (and sometimes irreconcilable) con-
cepts and constructions. Each true thought fits well into
some cognitive map of the situation and, to some extent
validates the use of that map at that time. One hopes that
some at least of the true thoughts one has in such a clinical
situation allow us to move with assurance and propriety
in our actions toward the patient. On that basis, a thought
– for instance about the meaning of an illness event in the
whole context of a person's life among others might be a
good thought with truth-bearing and adequately action-
guiding qualities. It has, we could say, both epistemic and
practical value which, for a pragmatist, largely coincide.
I have, following Lacan, claimed that a subject with the
appropriate attitude towards medical truth is troubled by
human suffering especially if medical science finds it nei-
ther understood or even signifiable in a way that allows us
to work towards an answer. This ethical sensitivity poten-
tiates a tuche – a residue that may escape scientific signifi-
cation – and a properly attuned soul will return again and
again to the "wound in his clinical psyche" that is his or
her inability to respond to the suffering.
Therefore moral virtue and epistemic virtue are inter-
twined. It takes a certain kind of person (one with what
Nussbaum calls a developed "sense of life") to achieve the
relevant openness to experience [37], and it takes not only
a certain kind of cognitive skill to conceptualize what
experience reveals but also an ability to deconstruct and
escape the validated links that are created and legitimated
by an area of discourse. Clinical praxis involves subjective
bodies and their intersecting trajectories, a reality that
engages a clinician with patients, so that the suffering of
the patient spurs them to try out ways of conceptualizing
what is going on until they discover regularities that are
worth pursuing. The result is Hippocratic knowledge, that
multifaceted set of skills that can respond adequately to
suffering despite a very imperfect framework of theory at
any given point in that enterprise.
Truth, virtue, and discovery
These vague moves towards a post-Kuhnian and post-
structuralist epistemology for medical science take us back
towards the epistemic and practical values endorsed by
Hippocrates. I have used the term "epistemic virtue" and
linked epistemic and moral virtue, in a way that Plato and
Aristotle both could be taken to suggest, as different facets
of the same jewel. But is this position robust in the face of
a post-modern critique of clinical practice and its scientific
products?
Foucault argues that power and relations of power control
the legitimation of statements within any given discourse.
This applies a fortiori in medical discourse where a set of
power relations confer an exalted status on the conceptu-
alizations and validated judgments of doctors as distinct
from others. Doctors decide "what is really going on",
"the good of the patient," "good evidence for this or that",
"a reasonable therapeutic option", and so on. The story of
the patient may be left out of this set of discursive con-
structions and, even more radically, the privileged dis-
course excludes the patient's opinion whether the medical
story actually fits his illness. If post-modernism teaches us
any lessons they would include the idea that the thoughts
or discursive constructions of situations that most deserve
our endorsement are those that transcend and reveal
power imbalances. This implies a moral constraint
whereby true knowledge extends a discourse and liberatesPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2006, 1:13 http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/13
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it from the regime put in place by a power group (such as
the biomedical industry). Liberation, in the case of clini-
cal knowledge should enable it to be owned equally by
the sufferer and the healer.
It emerges that the proper evaluative aspects of clinical
practice, the moral commitments of good doctors, and the
sharing of information and power, are inseparable from
the truths of the clinic. Lacan's remark about the purity of
the soul of the operator is therefore vindicated (for medi-
cine at least) in that clinical practice is best when the rela-
tion between the good and knowledge is clearly
appreciated (but not quite as Plato envisaged it) in ways
that are not always apparent in other areas of scientific
endeavour.
Hippocrates thought that medicine is a great exemplar of
science in general because it methodically and sensitively
charts the accumulated wisdom that comes from engaging
with the realities of the human condition. The insepara-
bility of praxis from science that is underscored by that
fact implies that real knowledge is more to do with acting
well than with building theoretical structures dominated
by an elite controlling a regime of truth. Truth cannot be
separated from the encounter with the real and the care
for human suffering with which the Hippocratic writers
attempted to infuse it. Lacan reinforces this crucial point
just where fuzzy relativism is often thought to loom large.
The intrusion of post-modern thinking into medical eth-
ics introduces the thought "that illness is no longer a
purely biological state – no longer a brute fact of nature –
but rather something in part created or interpenetrated by
culture" [38]. The idea that disease is a "biocultural" phe-
nomenon (Morris' term) suggests that medical truth goes
beyond the structure of signs, texts, and political functions
that control biomedical scientific truth and seeks the story
that has been appropriated by that framework. But then it
goes beyond the medical story to look at the encounter
with reality that occurs in a human life and inscribed itself
on the body of the individual concerned. This body has
fallen under the medical gaze and is not doing that which
it normally does and we need to appreciate the alienation
that has crept into the subjective body to understand the
patient's dis-ease.
An openness to individual meaning and beyond that to
the dynamic encounter between the patient, the doctor,
and the real might, therefore, be expected to reveal a truth
that goes beyond medicine.
There is, therefore a significant convergence between, on
the one hand, the epistemic and moral virtues of the
Hippocratic tradition (marked by compassion, empathy,
and pragmatism) and, on the other, the conception of
clinical science that emerges from the post-modern cri-
tique. This convergence allows us to move ahead in spec-
ifying some of the hallmarks of virtuous practice for the
Hippocratic professional in a post-modern era.
Conclusion: medicine and truth
Orthodox medicine has followed the Hippocratic model
gaining knowledge from cumulative experience of the
cases arising in clinical practice. However the intrinsic
power of academic and institutional medicine has made it
theory bound and paradigm dominated reinforcing its
tendency to occupy the epistemic high ground and to
appeal to demonstrated efficacy within the healing ethos.
Medicine has adopted the scientific model of truth but
that model is challenged when the tuche declares itself
and alerts us to the fact that our categories are not the
thing in itself but only a provisional and partial significa-
tion of it. Some stories serve to upset that paradigm in
thought-provoking ways.
The powerful placebo
The patient had a long-standing and refractory clinical
depression and had tried most of the available anti-
depressants without effect until she was enrolled in a drug
trial. The new treatment gave her dramatic and sustained
improvement, much to the relief of her clinical caregivers.
However she had, in fact, been in the placebo arm of the
trial. As ethicist, I was asked what her treating clinicians
should tell her.
The postponed craniotomy
I was about to do a craniotomy for a cerebral aneurysm
which had caused a sub-arachnoid haemorrhage. It was
Sunday afternoon and as I was about to scrub up and start,
the anaesthetist mentioned that the patient had
responded strangely during anaesthetic induction (as he
had throughout the 48 hours since his haemorrhage.) The
images of my discussions with him and his appearance
and responses passed before my mind, I felt that he would
suffer severe cerebral vasospasm and a stroke if I pro-
ceeded and that I should delay the operation. I said to the
O.R. team that I did not feel right about doing the opera-
tion despite all their preparations. The senior operating
theatre nurse said "If you don't feel right about it, you
should not go ahead." I thought to myself that I was a
good evidence based practitioner and that this kind of
thing was not part of rational clinical conduct but I bowed
to my misgivings and cancelled the operation. 24 hours
later, the patient was a different man and had his surgery
without complications (which, of course, might have hap-
pened anyway).
In each of these cases we enter a domain in which the
patient as a subjective body encounters the real and isPublish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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touched by it. We find that we are drawn beyond the com-
fort of the framework of theory and observation created
by scientific biomedical culture and realize that there are
more things in heaven and earth than are conceptualized
in our philosophy. We are then led to try and understand
what it is that our openness to life situations has brought
us into contact with. The recognition that we are "in
touch" with something real and a creative pursuit of what
eludes us then become a path to truth in the face of the
trauma that is human suffering.
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